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VOLATILITY AND MARKET INEFFICIENCY: A
COMMENTARY ON THE EFFECTS OF OPTIONS,




Over the past several years the securities markets have been infused
with options trading in order to provide an alternative way to participate
in short-term investments in securities. Put and call options on individual
securities allow investors to hedge their positions and thereby limit risk.
While this may be true for some investors, much options trading has been
on a speculative basis. Since its inception, public trading of options on
securities exchanges has been an active financial market. The success of the
options markets for individual securities paved the way for expansion into
index options which are subject to Securities and Exchange Commission
regulation and to futures contracts based on stock indexes, which are subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.' The
index markets permit investors to diversify their holdings by not tying their
investment to the stock of a particular issuer. Index options are broadly-
based indexes, the values of which are dependent upon the current per
share price of the stocks the indexes comprise. By utilizing the index markets
investors can take positions in groups of stocks tied to a publicly traded
index option or futures contract. The index markets have provided additional
opportunities for the new breed of arbitrageurs known as risk arbitrageurs.
The infusion of these highly leveraged investment vehicles into the
financial markets has been accompanied by a parallel development: the
advent of program trading systems which has accelerated due to the tech-
nology of the computer age. Over the past several years there have been
violent swings in the stock markets that have been attributed to options
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A., (1969), University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D., (1972), Columbia University. I would like to acknowledge
the helpful research assistance of Sandra L. Goddard, UNC Law Class of 1988. A substantial
portion of this article was completed before the market crash of October 19, 1987 ("black
Monday.") Thus, the article does not reflect an analysis of most of the subsequent developments.
1. See generally Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal
Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. Rav. 1599 (1986).
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and futures expiration dates as well as to program trading. In October,
1987 the stock market witnessed its worst single day in history (on the
highest volume in history) followed by several days of violent gyrations on
record volume. This unprecedented market performance was the culmination
of the increased volatility that has been building over the past several years.
This article takes the position that such volatility is evidence of the markets'
inefficiency in today's environment. Since options and financial futures do
provide an important function in the marketplace, they should be retained.
However, some type of regulation is necessary to preserve market efficiency
as well as to restore investor confidence.
Options provide an important device for hedging long positions in
securities. For example, an investor owning 1000 shares of ABC Co. stock,
currently trading at $12 per share, may want to limit the risk of a price
decline. An appropriate hedge strategy would be to buy puts with a strike
price of $10 per share.2 This would guarantee that at any time until the
expiration date the investor could sell the stock for $10 per share. Buying
the put will involve the cost of the premium that the market has placed on
the put and thereby the investor will have increased his total cost but will
have limited the risk of loss. Another example is the investor who believes
that the market is likely to decline and therefore has a large cash balance.
In order to hedge against the possibility that her negative market outlook
is wrong, she may want to purchase call options, in selected stocks or
broader-based index options, which would allow her to participate in a
market rise. The purchase of call options involves less cash than investing
in the underlying stock but also is much more speculative since the investor
stands to lose her entire investment if the option expires when the stock
price is below the option exercise price. Program trading has developed as
a new form of risk arbitrage whereby large volume traders who have seats
on the exchanges, and therefore do not have to pay commission charges,
take positions in both stocks and options. One strategy is for program
traders to engage in "arbitraging between large baskets of stocks and
positions in the index markets. ' 3 In addition to the more speculative risk
arbitrage transactions, more conservative investors have had a major impact
in the index markets. Mutual funds and other money managers frequently
use index futures and options as a means of hedging their portfolios through
what is known as portfolio insurance. Since portfolio insurance alone is
2. For additional examples of option strategies and a more detailed analysis of the risks
involved, see, e.g., UNDERSTANDING THE RISKS AND USES OF LISTED OPTIONS (Oct. 1982) (jointly
prepared by the American Stock Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Pacific Stock
Exchange, Philadelphia Stock Exchange, and the Options Clearing Corporation).
3. Hobson & Tosini, Regulatory Issues Relating to Stock Index Futures and Option
Markets, 6 Commod. L. Letter 1 (1986); see also, e.g., Laderman & Frank, How Chicago
Zaps Wall Street, Bus. WK., Sept. 16, 1986, at 95; Sebastian, How Program Trading Works
and Why it Causes Controversy in the Stock Market, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1986, at 19, col.
4; cf. Faust & Doukas, Taking the Bite out of Stock Index Futures Arbitrage Volatility,
Futures, Dec., 1985, at 50.
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now estimated to be a fifty billion dollar per year industry, 4 it is clear that
index related trading has had a major impact on the securities markets.
This article addresses the problems raised by the new volatility of the
markets. Specifically, the article addresses ways in which market efficiencies
can be restored without losing the positive impact of options, futures, and
the index markets.
II. AN OVERVImw oF ARBiTRAGE
This section compares the two basic types of arbitrage, pure arbitratge
and risk arbitrage. First, pure arbitrage is a riskless transaction in which
arbitrageurs are able to enter into simultaneous riskless transactions in order
to take advantage of price variations in different markets. By thus taking
advantage of market inefficiencies, pure arbitrage helps keep markets in
proper balance.
A recently developing area has been so-called "risk arbitrage." In
contrast to pure arbitrage, risk arbitrage is an investment technique whereby
risk arbitrageurs take advantage of price discrepancies based on the market's
assessment of various risks. When the arbitrageurs view the risk as over-
valued by the marketplace they will step in. Risk arbitrage received its first
publicity in the context of corporate takeovers in which the risk arbitrageurs
take advantage of the price differential between the public markets and the
price to be paid in connection with an announced merger or takeover. Risk
arbitrage in the securities of takeover targets accounts for a major portion
of the trading that takes place once a takeover offer has been made.5
As will be developed more fully below, risk arbitrage poses different
problems than exist with pure arbitrage. Specifically, risk arbitrage poses a
significant threat of market manipulation if not properly regulated.
A. Pure Arbitrage
Pure arbitrage is a transaction, or series of transactions, that enable
the arbitrageur to profit from price differentials for the same item in parallel
markets. 6 Arbitrage is possible not only when the same item is traded in
different markets but also when there is a market for an equivalent of the
4. McMurray, CBOE Holds a Lead on Amex in Battle for European-Style Stock-Index
Options, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 46, col. 3.
5. See, e.g., Bleakley, When Merger Plans Crash, Arbitragers Rush to Bail Out, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1985, sec. 4, at 8, col. 3; Stern, Wall Street's New Synthetics, FoRaEs, June
18. 1984, at 190; Wells, Inside the Arbitrage Game, 15 Inst. Investor 41 (1981).
6. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-15533, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,808B (JAN.
29, 1979) (discussing "bona fide" and "risk" arbitrage). See generally M. EvANS, ARBrrRAGE
IN DomEsTic SEcusruEs IN Ta UNITED STATES (1965). For a description of arbitrage in the
foreign currency markets, see Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank International Corp., 540 F.2d 548, 551-
52 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. People v. Vineberg, 125 Cal. App.3d 127, 177 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1981)
(fraudulent scheme involving precious metals arbitrage), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 945 (1982).
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item in question as is the case with convertible securities, 7 options markets,'
and the futures markets. 9 One benchmark of pure arbitrage is a simultaneity
in transactions which insures that the arbitrageur is engaging in a riskless
enterprise. 0 Both in theory and in practice, pure arbitrage performs a
positive function by eliminating inefficiencies in parallel markets. The ab-
sence of market inefficiencies that lead to price differentials in parallel
markets will necessarily deny the availability of opportunities for arbitrage."
For example, if gold is trading in the London spot market at $400 per
ounce, and is quoted in the New York spot market at $398 per ounce, an
arbitrageur could make a profit by purchasing New York gold and simul-
taneously selling London gold. Transaction costs such as brokerage com-
missions and delivery requirements render such an arbitrage transaction
unprofitable to everyone but the professional who is able to eliminate,
severely limit, or absorb his or her own transaction costs. The foregoing
example shows how arbitrage can be used to take advantage of parallel
markets.
Prior to the advent of the consolidated tape for trading in exchange-
listed securities, it was possible to engage in similar transactions by entering
simultaneous orders on the New York and Pacific stock exchanges.' 2 Not-
withstanding the advent of the consolidated tape and the move toward a
national market system, inefficiencies in the securities markets may still give
rise to opportunities for pure arbitrage such as those that may exist with
regard to convertible securities. 3
7. See infra note 13 (providing an example of arbitrage using convertible securities).
8. See generally Report of the Special Study of the Options Market to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (1978).
9. See, e.g., Ingersoll & Sebastian, SEC Staff Considering a Move to Lessen Stock
Swings Tied to Triple Expirations, Wall St. J., Sept. 29, 1986, at 93, col. 3; Laderman, Follow
the Spread or the Market Will Leave You Behind, Bus. Wk., Dec. 29, 1986, at 84; Seligman,
Don't Fret About Program Trading, FORTUNE, Oct. 18, 1986, at 88.
10. For example, in order to qualify for the arbitrage exemption from the Securities
Exchange Act's prohibitions against insider short swing profits, it is necessary that both ends
of the transaction be entered into simultaneously. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(e) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 16e-
1 (1986); Lewis v. Dekcraft Corp., [1973-74 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,620
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); T. HAZEN, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF SEcURiTIEs REGULATION § 12.7 (1985
& 1988 Supp.).
11. Such a move has taken place in the securities markets with the movement toward a
more efficient market system. See, e.g., Asdrew, Linking Trading in Stocks and Index Futures
Roils Critics More than Prices, Wall St. J., June 16, 1986, at 15, col. 1; Lee, What's With
the Casino Society?, FoRBEs, Sept. 22, 1986, at 158; Malkiel, Why Markets are Working
Better, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1986, at 10, col. 4.
12. In order to make the securities markets more efficient, there has been a move away
from disjointed markets, toward a national market system. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a) (1982). See
generally Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure in Industry Self-
Improvement, 70 VA. L. REv. 785 (1984); see also Macey & Haddock, Shirking at the SEC:
The Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL L. REv. 315.
13. This can be seen from the following example:
In the case of convertible debentures, arbitrage may occur when the debentures are
[Vol. 44:789
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B. Risk Arbitrage
As noted in the previous section, the essence of a pure arbitrage
transaction is not only the simultaneity of the transactions but also the
riskless nature of the undertaking. Risk arbitrage, as the name implies,
introduces elements of risk into transactions designed to take advantage of
price disparities between markets.
1. Risk arbitrage in takeover stocks
A popular and widely-publicized type of risk arbitrage arises in the
context of tender offers for publicly traded companies. Typically, when the
issuer has agreed to a merger, or is the subject of a tender offer, the issuer's
stock will trade below the tender offer price unless the market anticipates
an increase in consideration. 4 The differential between the merger or tender
offer price reflects the risk that the transaction will not go through. Thus,
as the name indicates, risk arbitrage differs from pure arbitrage in that the
arbitrageur is incurring a risk-the risk that the merger or tender offer will
not succeed, will be withdrawn, or will be set aside as illegal.' 5
There is some regulation of risk arbitrage in the the context of takeover
stocks in the form of the SEC's prohibitions against hedged tendering and
short tendering.' 6 The effects of risk arbitrage on the takeover market is
currently under examination. 7 The impact of risk arbitrage in the market
for takeover stocks is only part of the problem addressed herein: the extent
to which short-term market forces have become the primary factor in stock
market performance.
2. Options, futures, indexes, and risk arbitrage
Increases in the popularity of the options markets, in general, and the
index markets, in particular, have presented new opportunities for risk
selling at a price lower than the equivalent amount of common stock. The arbitrageur
will buy the bonds and sell the stock, making a profit equal to the price differential.
For example, if a debenture selling at 1200 is convertible into 40 shares of common
stock selling at 30 1/2, the arbitrageur can buy a debenture and sell the equivalent
amount of common stock (40 shares), making a gross profit of 20 dollars per bond.
Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 466, 467 (1971).
14. The stock may trade above the merger or tender offer price when the market values
the price as insufficient and places a higher value on the stock in anticipation of a counter
offer or increase in the amount of the consideration offered. Exchange Act Release No. 34-
15533 (Jan. 29, 1979) 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 22808B (discussing risk arbitrage).
15. Invalidity of the proposed acquisition under the antitrust laws is one such risk, as
was recently the case with Standard Oil of California's acquisition of Gulf Oil Corp.
16. See, e.g., Demott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons From the
British, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 945, 998-1003 (1983). The SEC has denominated a number of
tender offer practices as manipulative. For example, SEC Rule lOb-4 prohibits the practice of
short tendering. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-4 (1986); see infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
17. There have been conflicting views concerning the desirability of regulating risk
arbitrage in the context of tender offers. See generally Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in
Tender Offers, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 466 (1971); Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage be
Regulated?, 1978 Duke L.J. 1000.
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arbitrage. For example, investors with a large capital stake are able to take
advantage of the "spread" between the cash value of the indexes and the
futures or options price. Additionally, investors owning stocks represented
by the index options or futures can hedge their investments through their
positions in the underlying securities by taking positions in the derivative
investments provided by stock options, index options, and futures. Investors
have worked out systems for program trading in the underlying securities
based on movements in the index options and futures. 18 For example, money
managers can hedge their portfolios by taking "synthetic" positions in index
options or futures. A synthetic position consists of a spread between the
same index option at two different strike prices. This type of portfolio
insurance is now estimated to be at least a fifty billion dollar per year
industry. 19
C. Regulation of Risk Arbitrage
Although it is generally conceded that pure arbitrage has a beneficial
effect on the markets, not all arbitrage is condoned. Thus, for example,
pure arbitrage is indeed riskless and is exempt from the Securities and
Exchange Act's prohibitions against short-swing profits by officers, direc-
tors, and ten percent beneficial owners of the issuer's stock.20 In contrast,
risk arbitrage is subject to abuse based on misuse of inside information and
therefore is subject to the short-swing prohibitions. 2' Similarly, in Rule lOb-
4 the SEC has outlawed hedged tendering and short tendering in connection
with tender offers for the stock of a corporate takeover target. 22 Short
tendering consists of tendering shares that are not owned with the hope of
covering the tender in the open market at a lower price. Hedged tendering
consists of tendering shares when the owner of the shares has written call
options against the shares.23 When a tender offer is made, the price of the
stock usually trades below the offer price unless the market anticipates that
a competing tender offer or other market force will result in the price of
the offer being raised.Y Short tendering would permit large risk arbitrage
positions to assure the success of a tender offer without the arbitrageur
having to make the up-front investment of purchasing the shares tendered.
Were short tendering and hedged tendering not prohibited, arbitrageurs'
18. See infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
19. See McMurray, CBOE Holds a Lead on Amex in Battle for European-Style Stock-
Index Options, Wall St. J., Dec. 15, 1986, at 46, col. 3.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(e) (1982).
21. T. Hazen, supra note 10, at § 12.7.
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1986). Hedged tendering and short tendering are most effective
in the context of a tender offer for less than all of the outstanding shares where a surplus of
tendered shares will result in the tenders being accepted on a pro rata basis.
23. See T. Hazen, supra note 10, at §§ 11.15, 12.1.
24. If the price of the tender offer is raised, or if the terms are otherwise varied, any
person tendering shares is entitled to the highest price rather than being limited to the terms
of the offer at the time of tender. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
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desire to lock in a profit could guarantee the success of a tender offer. The
SEC has thus taken the position that natural market forces, rather than
speculators engaging in risk arbitrage, should determine the success of tender
offers.
There is some evidence that risk arbitrage positions involving stock
options and the index markets, which involve tying the position to the
underlying stocks, can result in artificially volatile price swings. 25 SEC Rule
lOb-4's prohibitions against short tendering and hedged tendering recognize
that in some contexts arbitrage transactions can be manipulative and arti-
ficial rather than consistent with natural market forces and the promotion
of market efficiency. 26 The question thus presented is: how is program
trading and risk arbitrage based on the index markets any more consistent
with an efficient market than hedged or short tendering in connection with
tender offers?
III. OPTIONS, FuTuREs, AND PROGRAM TRADING
A. The Options and Financial Futures Markets-An Overview
Not so many years ago the lifeblood of the securities markets was the
long-term investor who selected stocks based on the issuer's long-term
prospects. This investment objective held true for both individual and
institutional investors. 27 However, in recent years there have been dramatic
changes in the market's complexion and make-up. In 1973 the securities
markets expanded to include the public trading of put and call options. 28
25. See Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms (Jan. 12, 1988);
Gilpin, Traders Cross Fingers in the "Witching" Hour, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1986, § 4, at
1, col. 1. The Chairman of the SEC has stated his belief that index trading played a role in
the highly volatile market of late October, and early November, 1987. See Stock Index Futures
Contributed to Market Volatility, Ruder Says, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1683-84 (Nov.
6, 1987); see also Ruder Addresses Impact of Derivative Index Trading, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) Report Bulletin No. 1255, 12-13 (October 21, 1987).
In fact, following "black Monday," the New York Stock Exchange sought a voluntary
halt to program trading. See NYSE Limits Program Trading, Cuts Hours for Three Days, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1604-06 (Oct. 23, 1987). The markets gave a negative reception
to the resumption of program trading. See 58.85 Drop Puts Dow at 1,900.20-Full Program
Trading, Dollar Worry Buyers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1987, at 33, col. 6. But cf. Index
Arbitrage Played Small Role in Market Volatility, CFTC's Hineman Says, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1667-68 (Oct. 30, 1987); see also infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
26. A response by the SEC signaled its receptivity to risk arbitrage using index option.
A significant letter exempts the unwinding of index positions from the "down tick" prohibition
applicable to short sales of securities generally. See Merrill Gets SEC Exemption From Short-
Sale Rule for Index Arbitrage, SEc. WK., Dec. 22, 1986, at 1. See infra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text.
27. See Laderman, Weiss, Frank, Cahan & Cunes, Those Big Swings on Wall Street,
Bus. WK., April 7, 1986, at 34; Sebastian, supra note 3.
28. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-9985 [1972-1973 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 79,212 (FEB. 1, 1973). See generally Report of the Special Study of the Options
Markets to the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 8, at 1; see also supra note
2 and accompanying text.
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A call option is a contract under which the seller or writer of the option
agrees to sell the underlying security to the call option buyer at the "strike
price." Each call option has an expiration date. For publicly traded options,
the expiration date is the third Friday of a designated month. A put option
entitles the seller, or writer, of the put option to purchase the security from
the put option buyer at the exercise price before the expiration date. The
seller of a put or call option will receive a premium that depends upon the
relationship of the strike price to the current market price of the underlying
security and the length of time until the expiration date.
Public options trading is regulated by the SEC in its oversight of the
national securities exchanges on which the options are traded. 29 SEC regu-
lation. imposes certain price and volume requirements for the underlying
security as a prerequisite to trading options in that security. The SEC
requires disclosures as to the particular risks of options trading and super-
vises surveillance of the options market.30
This regulation has been an important factor in maintaining a stable
market, but there has been some fall-out in terms of the impact on the
securities markets in general. Specifically, as discussed more fully below,
many stock traders, especially institutions and money managers, have trading
positions that balance stock and options positions. This strategy has resulted
in program buy and sell systems.31 Also, since many investors are playing
the spreads between the index option or cash futures prices and the under-
lying stock values, options expiration dates frequently trigger large market
swings.32
While some maintain that there has not been any such increase in
volatility, 33 the public and regulators are aware of dramatic changes in the
29. Securities options are currently traded on the Chicago Board of Options, American,
Pacific, Philadelphia, Midwest, and New York exchanges.
30. See Report of the Special Study of the Options Market, supra note 8.
31. "For example, portfolio insurance programs which resemble classic hedging tech-
niques, may exacerbate market swings since such programs signal a sale of stocks following a
decline of specified index and purchases of stocks when the value of the index is rising."
Hobson & Tosini, supra note 3, at 13.
32. See, e.g., Laderman & Frank, supra note 3, at 95.
33. See, e.g., Edwards, Stock Index Futures and Stock Market Volatility: Evidence and
Implications, 6 CommoD. L. LETTER 3 (1986). As other commentators have explained:
Countering this general perception that the stock market has become more volatile
in recent years, certain empirical analyses tend to indicate that, on balance, stock
market volatility has not been particularly high over the last two years when stock
index futures and option activity has increased dramatically. Further, significant
reversals in actual stock index levels have not occurred in the one- or two-day
periods following sharp changes in the indices on several non-expiration days in
1986. This suggests that such changes have not been aberrations relative to market
fundamentals Some analysts have thus characterized stock index derivative markets
as more finely tuned and quickly responsive measures of overall stock market
sentiment rather than as independent causes of changing stock market prices.
Hobson & Tosini, supra note 3, at 13 (footnotes omitted) (citing L. BnuNYL & H.N. HANSON,
MARKET VoLATmiTY; AN UPDATED STUDY (Salomon Brothers, Inc., 1986); M.A. ZuRAcK, HAS
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market environment. Thus, for example, there are various proposals being
considered to eliminate the volatility.3 4 Although the new volatility in the
markets may in large part be attributable to options and futures expiration
dates, that is not the only source. As one observer has pointed out, there
is a new state of mind in the market that makes the securities markets more
closely resemble the short-term and heretofore more volatile commodity
markets.3 5 It has also been suggested that as the fundamentals (or technical
health) of the equity markets affect securities trading, emphasis on index
options and other derivative investments will magnify the effect of reactive
price swings. 36 It is submitted that the shift to short-term trading, triggered
in large part by the options markets, has led to significant inefficiencies in
the market.
These inefficiencies can result in substantial losses to unwary investors
who get caught in the backlash from options trading. For example, it has
been observed that the index markets have turned investors away from long-
THE STOCK MARKET BECoME MORE VOLATILE SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF STOCK INDEX
FUTURES CONTRACTS? (Goldman Sachs, 1985)); see also B. COLLINS, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF STOCK INDEX FTrruaEs PRICES (Columbia Futures Center Working Paper No. 135, 1986);
J. MERRICK, VOLUME DETERMINATION IN STOCK AND STOCK INDEX FUTURES MARKET: AN
ANALYSIS OF ARBITRAGE AND VOLATILITY EFFECTS (Salomon Brothers Center, New York
University, Working Paper No. 374, April 1986); H. STOLL & R. WHALEY, EXPIRATION DAY
EFFECTS OF INDEX OPTIONS AND FUTURES: SUMIMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS AND AN EXAMINATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES IN EXPIRATION PROCEDURES, (Owen
Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University, 1986).
It is not surprising that many of the foregoing sources are associated with or sponsored
by members of the professional trading community.
34. See Ingersoll & Sebastian, supra note 9, at 6; see also infra notes 58-66 and
accompanying text.
35. Byrne, Program Trading-A Trader's Perspective, 6 COMuMOD. L. LETTER 9, 10-11
(1986). According to Byrne,
[m]y own unproven view is that stock index futures have introduced what I call a
commodities mindset into the equity market. Traditional commodity traders tend to
have a very short-term time horizon and rely heavily on technical analysis and trend-
following systems. They seem to thrive on sudden, sharp price movements and on
price trends that continue as far as possible in one direction. Such price behavior
may be good for professional traders and may even be good for common stocks so
long as prices are going up. But this commodity mindset may be dangerous when
prices are dropping.
36. Hobson & Tosini, supra note 3, at 12-13:
If stock market prices generally rise or fall as a result of, for example, a shift in
market fundamentals, speculative and hedging transactions in derivative markets may
be reflected rapidly in price changes in these markets. If the prices of derivative
contracts reflect discounts or premiums to stock market prices that are sufficiently
large, arbitrage activity-either the establishment of new arbitrage positions or the
unwinding of previously established positions-is likely to be triggered. The stock
purchases or sales that constitute the "cash legs" of such arbitrage transactions will
then tend to move stock prices in a direction consistent with the initial shift in
fundamentals. And such transactions may lead to further rounds of speculative
hedging and' cash-futures arbitrage activity, resulting in large swings in stock prices.
See also, e.g., Laderman, supra note 9, at 84.
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term investment strategies traditionally associated with stocks, to the short-
term speculation more frequently associated with commodity futures.37 Since
the options markets can, and do in large part, provide a useful function,
the solution is not to disband those markets. Rather, the solution lies in
regulating the traders who engage in such program and options related
buying and selling. Such regulation would keep the market more efficient
with regard to the fundamental factors affecting investors38 instead of
reacting wildly to short-term indicators. Briefly put, the efficient capital
market hypothesis is that stock prices accurately reflect expert analysts'
valuation of the totality of publicly available information.
39
With regard to the bulk of day-to-day trading, there has been a shift
away from the long-term with investors' now focusing on the short-term.
The shift has resulted from many factors including the highly competitive
nature of the mutual fund industry as well as other aspects of investment
management and the concomitant emphasis on favorable quarterly reports.
In order to show favorable reports and attractive portfolios, many fund
managers feel compelled to dress up their portfolios. Thus, institutions are
motivated to engage in significant amounts of short-term trading. Addition-
ally, the rapid rise of the options markets for securities, 40 as well as the
acceptance of the commodities futures market as an alternative investment,
have further refocused the markets' emphasis on the short-term.
Put and call options on individual securities allow investors to hedge
their positions and thereby limit risk. Investors with long-term positions in
securities can use put and call options to take a short-term hedge against
their long-term investments. Thus, for example, investors holding a long-
term position in a stock can write call optiohs against the stock in order to
protect themselves against a short-term decline. Alternatively, investors
37. See Byrne, supra note 35.
38. See, e.g., J. FRANCIS, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 651-61 (1979); J.
LotmE, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: TimoRIs AND EVIDENCE 56, 65 (2d ed.
1985); Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383 (1970); Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. EcON. REV.
212 (1972); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory, and Regulation
of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977). For critical views of the efficient
capital market hypothesis, see, e.g., Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Infor-
mation and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.L. REv. 761 (1985); Wang, Some Arguments That
the Stock Market is not Efficient, 119 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 341 (1986); see also Givoly &
Lakonishok, The Information Content of Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: Some
Evidence on Semi-Strong Efficiency, 1 J. AccTG. & EcoN. 165 (1979); Lowenstein, Pruning
Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLTrM L. REV. 249, 276-89
(1983).
39. As one court has summarized the efficient capital market hypothesis:
economists have now amassed sufficient empirical data to justify a present belief
that widely-followed securities of larger corporations are "efficiently" priced: the
market price of stocks reflects all available public information and hence necessarily,
any material misrepresentations as well.
In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
40. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKET supra note 8.
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desiring to purchase a security but believing that the price will drop can
sell put options exercisable at the price they are willing to pay. When an
investor believes a stock is under priced he or she may wish to purchase a
call option. However, such a position would be speculative since, if the
stock does not reach the exercise price before the expiration date, the
investor loses the entire investment.
41
B. The Current Market Environment
1. Index arbitrage and program trading
Some options are based on indexes comprising certain stocks. Others
are broad-based market indexes such as the Value Line index and one based
on the Standard & Poor 500 index. Some indexes are based on narrower
composite indexes such as those paralleling the Standard & Poor 100 index
and those approximating the Dow Jones Industrial Average. In addition
there are industry-based indexes such as the technology index. A parallel
development has occurred in the futures markets with the advent of financial
futures.
In addition to futures based on government securities, there are now
publicly traded futures contracts based upon the same types of indexes that
form the basis for options. In addition to straight futures contracts, there
is now a public market for options on futures. It is argued that all of these
financial instruments make the market more efficient by providing alter-
native investments that help keep the markets on a more even keel. 42 Money
managers have taken advantage of these new investment vehicles. Many
mutual funds have arisen in connection with the options markets. Addi-
tionally, the options and financial futures markets provide a new way for
money managers to diversify and hedge their portfolios.
Widely followed options and futures indexes have also provided a new
mechanism for traders who base their investments on the markets' technical
factors rather than on the fundamentals of the underlying securities or
commodities. The computer age has aided these technical investors in that
simultaneous investments across several markets are now much more acces-
sible.
Program trading involves the use of computers to track price discrep-
ancies between index futures contracts, index options, and the cash value
of the stocks underlying the indexes. A computer driven program permits
the large investor to monitor the relative prices of index futures, options
and the cash value of the index.43 When it appears that there is a discrepancy
41. See generally P. JOHNSON, COmMODImEs REGULATION (1982); Gilberg, supra note 1.
42. See e.g., J. Bumuis, A TREATISE ON MARKETS: SPOT, FuTuREs, AND OPTIONS (1979);
Malkiel, supra note 11, at 16.
43. See Investment Technology: Is Your Stock Broker User Friendly?, The Economist,
Oct. 25, 1986, at 79.
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between the option or futures premium and the cash value, the trader will
lock in a profit by arbitraging one against the other. For example, if the
futures price is discounted below the cash value of the index, 4 the trader
who is long in the stocks will begin a "sell program" in which he or she
will sell the stock and buy the discounted futures contract. When the futures
are trading at a premium above the cash value, the trader will begin a "buy
program" which consists of selling the futures contract and buying the
stocks that the index comprises.
The newly developed index funds have further magnified the effects of
program trading. Successful program trading, as is the case with any type
of arbitrage, requires large volume transactions with low individual trans-
action costs. Furthermore, it would take an investment of approximately
twenty-five million dollars to invest in the stock underlying the Standard &
Poor 500,41 one of the popular indexes that forms part of the basis for
index futures and options arbitrage. Thus, program trading is not a viable
route for most individual investors. The index funds permit individual
investors to participate in program trading by pooling their investments into
a fund managed by an investment advisor who invests in indexed stocks,
futures, and options in accordance with the program trading guidelines
discussed above.
2. The market impact of index arbitrage and program trading
In addition to the foregoing program trading systems, other systems
have been developed to help balance stock market movements. One result
has been that when analysts' technical systems issue a buy or sell signal,
the markets react in a very volatile manner. Also, on the third Friday of
each month when options are set to expire, there have been some truly
exceptional market reactions. This is especially true on "triple witching"
days when options, index options, and index futures all expire.
46
It is ironic that financial instruments whose justification is the increase
of market efficiency have been accused of having quite the opposite effect
in terms of increasing volatility and wide swings in both market averages
and individual securities. 47 Such an environment is nothing more than a
trap for the unwary individual investor. There have been a number of
proposals for dealing with the volatility created by program trading. These
proposals include requiring arbitrageurs to disclose all long and short
44. Such a discount would reflect a futures traders' collective decision that the cash
market will drop over time.
45. See Seligman, supra note 9, at 88.
46. For example, on December 19, 1986, there was a record 118 million shares traded
in the last hour of trading. See McMurray, CBOE Rejects "Triple Witching" Plan Made by
Chicago Mere to Cut Volatility, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1987, at 31. However, unlike most of
the prior triple witching Fridays, this action was not accompanied by a precipitous sell-off in
the stocks. Id.
47. Hobson & Tosini, supra note 3; see also, e.g., Laderman & Frank, supra note 3, at
95; Sebastian, supra note 3 at 19, col. 4; cf. Faust & Doukas, supra note 3 at 50.
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positions in order to help the market anticipate the reaction as the options
and futures expire or become due.
Computerized trading and computerized execution of trades permit high
volume traders who do not have to absorb the costs of retail commissions
to execute trades within nanoseconds. 4 The leverage of options and futures
magnifies the impact of such trading on the market, especially when risk
arbitrageurs and index funds, as well as other institutional investors, are
using the underlying securities to hedge or straddle their investments.
Statistical evidence tends to indicate that program trading has a tre-
mendous impact on the equity markets. For example, it has been said that
on the average, program related trading acc6unts for twenty-five percent of
stock volume in any given week. 49 However, the evidence to date is incon-
clusive as to whether that impact can be translated directly into increased
volatility. For example, the SEC's preliminary review of the 114 point
decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average on January 23, 1987 did not
reveal any relationship to program trading. 0 Perhaps, more will be learned
from studies relating to the wild market swings of October, 1987. Notvith-
standing the evidence of a direct link to program trading, an SEC official
commented that the leverage created by index arbitrage increases the poten-
tial for such volatility and further that it is "foolish" to ignore the
psychological impact that program trading has on investors and the market."
It has been suggested, however, that the burden of proof should fall on
those seeking to regulate index related arbitrage. 2 The market's performance
since October 19, 1987 may go a long way toward satisfying that burden.
There is a division among the commentators as to the extent of the
adverse effects, if any, of program trading. Dean Malkiel's observation is
that volatility has not increased in the past few years.53 His claim is that
48. A nanosecond is a high technology term, literally meaning one-one billionth of a
second, that captures the virtual simultaneity of actions.
49. See Sebastian, supra note 3, at 19. See also Report of the Presidential Task Force,
supra note 25.
50. SEC Review Shows Jan. 23 Market Plunge Not Caused by Program Trading, SEc.
WK., Feb. 9, 1987, at 9. The SEC is also analyzing the 121 point decline in the Dow average
on September 11 and 12, 1986. Id. The results of this and similar analyses will be reported
to Congress. See Dingell Blasts SEC, Exchanges for Inaction on Recent Market Gyrations,
SEc. WK., Feb. 2, 1987, at 1.
51. SEC Review Shows Jan. 23 Market Plunge Not Caused by Program Trading, supra
note 50, at 9; see also Average Investor May Shun Stock Market Following Last Week's
Volatility, SEC. WK., October 26, 1987, at 1.
52. "Such fears (of plunging markets) are purely speculative. In theory, it is just as
likely that day-to-day volatility attracts investor interest, increasing the liquidity of the stock
market and lowering capital costs. Surely, then, the burden of proof rests with those who
would limit trading in the index futures. The plunging Dow only looks scary." Editorial,
Behind the Ow in the Dow, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, at 34, col. 1.
The fallacy in the argument, above, is that the risk is not only one of a sharp decline
but of volatility in general. A further flaw is the belief that the market is being driven by
forces unrelated to the fundamentals of the underlying investments.
53. Malkiel, supra note 11, at 16, col. 4 (the author is dean of the Yale University
School of Organization and Management).
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overall volatility has, in fact, been lower than in the early-1980s although
there may appear to be higher volatility on a day-to-day basis due to what
he describes as the "scale effect."' 54 By way of example, he suggests that a
daily Dow Jones Industrial Average move of twenty points today is less
significant than a ten point move when the Dow was at less than one-half
of its current level.
While this is certainly true on a percentage basis, the absolute numbers
reflect dollar gains or losses. The market's performance in late October,
1987 questions the conclusion that there has not been an increase in
volatility. Further, today's average volume is significantly higher than in
past years. Thus, any move in the averages represents more than in the
past in terms of the dollar impact on investors. Dean Malkiel concludes
that the index markets make the market more efficient but that the inability
to meet the volume of orders that arise in connection with expiration dates
presents problems. He therefore recommends public disclosure of such order
imbalances so that investors can adjust accordingly.
5
Professor Stoll has argued that while volatility may increase in connec-
tion with triple witching expiration Fridays, there is no significant impact
on individual stock prices.16 The assumption behind such an argument is
that individual traders who invest on the basis of fundamental rather than
technical factors are not affected since they should not be swayed by such
technical movements.57 Investors who decide to trade on more technical
factors are opening themselves up to the risks of the new volatility. 8
However, investors trading only on fundamentals stand to be injured by
large price swings unless they "stay at home" on expiration days and during
periods when program buy or sell trading has been initiated. The problem
is that without disclosure of order imbalances and trading programs, the
investor does not know about such activity until after the fact. Accordingly,
the investor relying on fundamentals may not have only his or her entry
and exit prices affected by the new volatility but also may have to time
enter and exit from the market in accordance with the technical traders'
activity. Another criticism of the impact of program trading and index
arbitrage is that it places the short-term fate of the market into the hands
of a relatively few, but very powerful, money managers.5 9
3. Proposed regulatory responses
The SEC and the exchanges have voiced concern over the impact of
computerized trading and the impact on the market, especially in connection
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Laderman, Those Big Swings on Wall Street, Bus. WK., April 7, 1986, at 32.
57. See Marcial, Playing a Roller-Coaster Market, Bus. Wi., Sept. 29, 1986, at 94.
58. Jonas & Farrel, Program Trading: Let the Little Guy In, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1986,
at 100.
59. See Laderman, supra note 56, at 36.
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with options and futures expiration dates.6 The SEC has suggested seeking
(at least on a voluntary, experimental basis) disclosure of all open orders
to be executed on the close of trading on options expiration dates. 6'
Disclosure of order imbalances sufficiently ahead of the close of trading on
expiration days would give arbitrageurs, program traders, and other investors
ample opportunity to place their off-setting orders.6 2 It is thought that
disclosure would let the market anticipate the last minute trading rather
than experience volatile price and volume swings at the stock market's
closing. 63 Under the proposal which would be initially implemented as a
voluntary experiment, major imbalances in orders to be executed on the
close of trading for selected actively traded stocks would be disclosed at
3:30, which is one-half hour before closing. 64 SEC Chairman Ruder has
also suggested trading halts to help curb volatility resulting from program
trading.
65
An alternative solution offered by the New York Stock Exchange would
be to tie the price of index options and futures to the opening of trading
on Friday rather than to its closing.6 6 An SEC official has proposed brief,
simultaneous trading halts in trading on both the stock and index markets.67
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange initially proposed daily limits on price
moves of index futures as a way to control volatility, but that suggestion
has since been withdrawn.68 The market activity in October, 1987 has led
to renewed talk of daily limits and the possibility of other trading halts.
Although such measures would certainly help soften the impact of program
60. See Laderman & Cahan, The Triple Witching Hour: Trying to Make it Less Spooky,
Bus. WK., Sept. 22, 1986, at 32; SEC Asks Big Board to Test Proposal Aimed at Curbing
Sharp Price Swings, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1986, at 45, col. 1; SEC Staff Seeks Big Board
Test in Price Swings, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1956, at 3, col. 4; Exchanges Lean Towards Friday
Afternoon Solutions to Program Trading, Sac. WK., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1.
While at one time it appeared that the options and futures exchanges were supportive of
at least minimal corrective action, the Chicago Board of Options Exchanges has recently come
out in opposition, denying the existence of an options expiration related problem. See
McMurray, supra note 46, at 31. Additionally, the New York Futures Exchange has postponed
consideration of the New York Stock Exchange's proposal to change the expiration procedure
for stock index futures so as to key the expiration to opening rather than closing stock prices.
See NYSE Board Balks at Changing Stock Index Expiration to Opening Prices, SEc. WK.,
Jan. 12, 1987, at 1.
61. SEC Staff Seeks Big Board Test in Price Swings, supra note 60, at 3.
62. 'Triple Witching' Didn't Bewitch Market: Regulators Aren't Sure Who Gets Credit,
Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1986, at 42.
63. SEC Staff Seeks Big Board Test in Price Swings, supra note 60, at 3.
64. SEC Asks Big Board to Test Proposal Aimed at Curbing Sharp Price Swings, supra
note 60, at 45.
65. See Ruder Suggests Trading Halt as One Way to Control Program Trading Volatility,
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1622-23 (Oct. 10, 1987).
66. SEC Staff Seeks Big Board Test in Price Swings, supra note 60, at 3.
67. See McMurray, SEC Aide Offers Way to Curb Price Swings, Wall St. J., March
20, 1987, at 13, col. 5.
68. McMurray, Chicago Merc Seeks to Curb Market Swings, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987,
at 3, col. 4; McMurray, SEC Aide Offers Way to Curb Price Swings, supra note 67.
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trading, they would not alter the fact that the securities markets will continue
in large part to be driven by short-term and technical factors. Both of these
factors operate against market efficiency since an efficient market reflects
a balance between fundamental and technical factors rather than an imbal-
ance favoring the side of technical indicators as magnified by program
trading.
As pointed out above, the SEC and the exchanges are currently consid-
ering a variety of proposals to regulate, or at least require, certain disclosures
concerning options and index related transactions. In addition to the risk
arbitrage regulation discussed directly above, there are some scattered re-
gulations that apply specifically to, or have particular impact upon, options
and index related transactions. An analysis of these regulations will show
whether the current regulatory environment is accommodative, neutral, or
hostile to option and index related arbitrage.
In a relatively recent no-action letter, the SEC granted an exemption
from the short sale rules to accommodate index related arbitrage.69 Selling
short is an investment strategy for investors who predict that the price of
a given security will decline. Selling short involves selling shares that one
does not own. This is accomplished by borrowing shares for immediate
delivery with the intent of covering the short position at a later date (and,
one hopes, at a lower price). Short selling is a speculative way for an
investor to take the position that a security's price is likely to drop. While
the securities are borrowed in order to cover the short position, the investor
is charged interest in the margin account until the short position is covered
by purchasing the security.70 The SEC prohibits investors from entering into
short sale transactions (that is, selling securities that they do not currently
own) on a down tick in a falling market.7 ' The no-action letter exemption
permits the unwinding of positions related to index arbitrage without regard
to the down tick rule. This exemption is obviously accommodative to index
related risk arbitrage. Refusal to grant such an exemption would add another
risk to index arbitrage, thus making it a less desirable form of investment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The past decade has brought a dramatic shift in emphasis in the securities
and other financial markets. We have recently witnessed unprecedented
market swings. The continuing development of new, highly leveraged in-
69. See Merrill Gets SEC Exemption From Short-Sale Rule for Index Arbitrage, supra
note 26, at 1; see also Exchange Act Release No. 34-20715 [1983-1984 Transfer Binder], Fed.
Sec, L. Rep. (CCH) 83, 504 (March 6, 1984) (exemption from "tick" provisions, applicable
to certain arbitrage-related transactions),
70. Short sales are regulated by SEC rules 10a-1 and 10a-2. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10a-1,
lOa-2 (1986). See generally T, Hazen, supra note 10, at § 10.12.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1(3)(b) (1986); see Exchange Act Release No. 34-20715 [1983-
1984 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83, 504 (March 6, 1984) (exemption from
"tick" provisions applicable to certain arbitrage-related transactions).
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vestment vehicles such as index options magnifies the impact of this shift.
Further magnification is provided by the increased daily trading volume in
the securities markets. Additionally, many observers believe that there has
been a parallel increase in market volatility.
Regulators, Congress, and commentators are currently undertaking a
significant examination of the need to regulate the index markets, program
trading, and risk arbitrageurs in general. There is considerable concern that
in the absence of regulation the markets are not efficient. As a result of
the perceived inefficiencies, many observers sense decreasing investor con-
fidence in long-term investments and increasing potential for injury to
investors who lack sufficient sophistication or risk bearing ability but
nevertheless venture into the short-term oriented market environment. The
stock market performance over the past few months has further highlighted
the new volatility. It is difficult to accept such violent market swings as a
byproduct of an efficient market. Legislators and regulators should think
long and hard before dismissing the need for controls on the limits of risk
arbitrage, program trading, and the proliferation of new investment vehicles.
The current market environment calls for increased, not decreased, regula-
tion.
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